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Abstract
The privacy of users of mobile devices has been at stake,
with emerging systems based on the mobile ad hoc network-
ing technology raising additional concerns. The establish-
ment of a connection between two nodes could readily re-
veal information to an eavesdropper. One approach to pre-
vent this is to provide receiver anonymity, i.e., conceal the
identity of the receiver, during the establishment of a com-
munication path. In this paper, we introduce such a scheme
that improves the efficiency of anonymous discovery, bal-
ances its cost among network nodes, and can be adaptive,
trading off the degree of anonymity for the receiver.
1 Introduction
The adoption of an increasingly wider range of mobile
computing applications raises concerns on the privacy of
the users of portable wireless devices. Eavesdropping com-
munications of such devices, either with other devices or
with the infrastructure (e.g., access points), can allow an
adversary to infer private information. For example, the
adversary could track communications and transactions of
each node, link those over long periods of time, or associate
nodes based on their communication patterns.
In case of multi-hop communication, with the nodes be-
ing the mobile ad hoc network (MANET) infrastructure,
routing protocols repeatedly discovering paths to specific
destinations provide the adversary with easy-to-intercept in-
formation. For example, a route request discloses readily
the source (querying node) and the destination (sought node
or receiver). In addition, depending on the type of the rout-
ing protocol, control packets, that is, the route request and
route reply for example, may disclose the entire path. Or,
the path could be disclosed by the data packet itself, if the
communication path is determined by the data sender.
A number of works in the literature have looked at how
to make such communication anonymous, that is, conceal
the identities of the communicating nodes from an eaves-
dropping adversary (e.g., [1, 2, 3] and references within).
Providing anonymous communication entails a number of
mechanisms concealing node identities at different phases
of communication. In all cases, querying the network for
a specific node is an important part of the system function-
ality. One approach to provide anonymity is to conceal the
identity of the sender. Another approach is to conceal the
identity of the receiver; or, in the best case, both identities.
Concealing the identity of the receiver is important, yet
it requires a cryptographic mechanism to do: the use of a
trapdoor, or, in other words, a function that can be calcu-
lated efficiently in one direction only with the knowledge of
a specific secret. In our context, such a trapdoor could be
set so that it can be opened only by the sought destination
node, while none of the other network nodes can identify
that node. However, all nodes that receive a message con-
taining such a trapdoor would expend resources attempting
to open it. In the case of a reactive MANET routing pro-
tocol, including such a trapdoor value to the route request
flooded in the network implies that all nodes should under-
take the corresponding overhead.
In this paper, we want to address this problem: to re-
duce the overhead for recipient anonymity in the MANET
context. To achieve this, we devise a randomized method
that allows nodes to determine with a low cost calcula-
tion whether they should attempt to open the trapdoor. In
our scheme, the sender selects for each discovery, that is
a given destination, a different random subset of the nodes
(essentially, node identifiers). It then constructs an identi-
fier, which we denote as the Semi Destination Set (SDS)
identifier, to allow nodes receiving the request to determine
if they are part of SDS and thus attempt to open the trap-
door. By regulating the size of SDS, the sender can trade off
anonymity for efficiency: the smaller the SDS is the lower
the protection and the processing cost in the network be-
comes. At the same time, the random selection a different
SDS essentially balances the load among network nodes.
In the rest of this short paper, we introduce our system
model, we describe in further detail our scheme, and pro-
vide a brief analysis, before we conclude with a brief de-
scription of on-going work.
2 System Model
We consider an ad hoc network composed of nodes
which have unique identifiers (e.g., IP addresses). More-
over, every node may have multiple pseudonyms (ran-
dom identifiers) corresponding to each node communicat-
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ing with. We assume that each node V has a public and
private key pair, PuKV , PrKV , issued by a Certification
Authority (CA) and also the public key of the CA. Nodes are
equipped with symmetric key hash functions and encryp-
tion/decryption algorithms. We assume that adversaries are
passive: they eavesdrop and can intercept all communica-
tions, and decrypt those for which they have the necessary
cryptographic keys.
3 The Proposed Scheme
In a route discovery, the request sender, S provides the
identity of the sought destination (receiver) D. To conceal
this, for example, IP address, we use the public key of the
destination or a symmetric key shared by S and D to en-
crypt this information (D address). This is essentially a
trapdoor that only D can open, as it possesses the corre-
sponding private key or the symmetric key itself. As a re-
sult, among all nodes that receive the route request, only the
designated destination can reply to the sender.
To reduce the overall overhead of opening the trapdoor
(decrypting the corresponding request field), we devise a
method that essentially induces this operation only to a sub-
set of the network nodes. We denote this set and its identi-
fier as the Semi Destination Set (SDS) and SDS ID respec-
tively. S does not actually select among the nodes but only
constructs an SDS ID which implies the identities of nodes
that potentially belong to the SDS.
The sought number of nodes in SDS, as a fraction of the
(potential) total of network nodes, is a protocol-selectable
parameter, ϕ, between 0 and 1. This essentially trades off
anonymity for efficiency, and can be updated and agreed
upon between S and D. For example, for nodes the sender
has to provide a high degree of anonymity, e.g., based on a
security policy, higher values for ϕ are used.
To further reduce overhead, in subsequent route discov-
eries, the SDS ID can be replaced with the pseudonym iden-
tifier of destination. The pseudonym is a large random num-
ber that S and D generate as its identifiers in their con-
nections with each other and exchanges securely, as an en-
crypted field of D response, thus being unknown to an ob-
server and in fact any other node. Then, only D bearing a
specific pseudonym is the only one that attempts to open the
trapdoor. Next, we describe in further details the construc-
tion of the SDS ID, how its membership function works, as
well as the request and reply phases in a route discovery.
SDS. To uniformly select between the nodes in the net-
work and place them in a same group with the destination,
we manipulate the IP address of the destination to form the
SDS ID. The SDS ID is composed of two parts: the
manipulated IP of the destination, which we term as the
Masked IP (MIP), along with a threshold, termed as the
Distance Threshold (DTH). All the IP addresses whose dis-
tance to the MIP is less than the DTH are members of
SDS. The distance is calculated simply by finding the differ-
ent bits between two addresses. The MIP is produced by
flipping a number of bits in the the destination’s IP address:
S selects a number 1 ≤ α ≤ DTH and flips randomly α
bits in the IP address of D. Actually, it has bto be done on
the host part of the IP address (bits which are 0 in the subnet
mask of the network).
To calculate the DTH , we consider the factor ϕ ≤ 1,
and the random variable X uniformly distributed over the
set of network’s IP addresses. Based on the definition of
SDS, the minimum z such that for any address a we have
Pr(DIFF (a,X) < z) ≥ ϕ will be assigned to the DTH,
where DIFF (IPa, IPb) implies the different bits between
two addresses IPa and IPb.
For every two S,D nodes that already performed an
SDS-based discovery, a destination pseudonym will be as-
signed to the MIP and DTH will be set to 0.
Request. The route request message contains a Trapdoor
field, in addition to the SDS ID. The Trapdoor contains
IP addresses of S and D to identify the IP address of source
node to D and to convince D that it is the destination of the
message. Moreover, SqN (sequence number) and Nonce
fields protect the protocol in front of replay attacks. KDS
is the shared key suggested by the node S for symmetric
cryptographic operations for future communications. The
pseudonym identifier of sender, PIDS , also is added. Fi-
nally, to authenticate the sender, a digital signature of node
S (based on its private key, over the Trapdoor’s fields),
DSS should be put into the trapdoor. After encrypting those
fields using the public key of D, the sender will broadcast
the message into the network. It is worth noting that, after
the first route discovery, the Trapdoor will be encrypted
using the shared key between S and D. The structure of
Trapdoor is as follows:
EPuKD (SqN‖Nonce‖IPD‖IPS‖KDS‖PIDS‖DSS).
Request processing and Reply. Every node that receives
the request message, checks the SDS ID; if it is in SDS, it
opens the Trapdoor using its private key. In the other cases
in which the DTH equals to 0, the receiver node checks
if the MIP matches to one of its pseudonyms. If so, the
Trapdoor will be opened using the shared key correspond-
ing to that pseudonym, and thus the corresponding source
or querying node S. If the node handling the request is not
in SDS or cannot open the Trapdoor, it relays the request.
D will update its connection table using provided fields
by the sender after opening the Trapdoor. D can commu-
nicate with S using their last pseudonyms and the symmet-
ric key provided by S. The destination node puts the last
pseudonym of the sender on the reply message accompa-
nied with the Response field that is constructed as follow-
ing:
EKDS (SqN‖IPD‖IPS‖PIDD)‖Nonce+ 1).
4 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the proposed method in terms
of the degree of recipient anonymity the system provides
and the imposed overhead on the network. N stands for
the number of nodes in the network and k is the number of
connections (route discoveries) that a given pair of nodes, S
and D, perform over their presence in the network.
4.1 Anonymity
Information Theoretic anonymity metrics to measure the
degree of anonymity were proposed in [4]. In this pa-
per, we use Entropy [5] to measure the degree of provided
anonymity in a communication system. To calculate the
entropy after the attacker observes the communication, the
probability to determine whether a node is the destination
of a given message or not, must be calculated. Considering
a message contains MIP , the percentage of nodes those
are within the SDS (equals to the ϕ) will open the message.
Clearly, for the other nodes the probability of being the des-
tination is 0. The degree of destination anonymity in the
network for only the first connection, that is, one that uses
the SDS concept, denoted as d1, is calculated as following:
d1 =
−
ϕ.N∑
i=1
ϕ log2(ϕ)
log2(N)
. (1)
For the messages related to subsequent connections, the
attacker can not obtain any information about the destina-
tion IP address because the end nodes use private random
one-time use pseudonym identifiers. Because all the nodes
are equally probable to be the destination the degree of
anonymity in the next connections, dn, equals to 1.
As no connection between the SDS-based message and
the subsequent ones can be made, the observer can not link
between them. Therefore, to obtain the overall degree of
anonymity, d, based on the average of d1 and dn, we calcu-
late it as following:
d =
d1 + (k − 1)× dn
k
. (2)
It is obvious that as the number of messages in the net-
work increases, the proportion of first contact becomes neg-
ligible and the degree of anonymity approaches to 1 (fully
anonymous).
Even if multiple SDS-based discoveries are necessary,
e.g., because of long source-destination disconnections,
those will infrequent. Moreover, the randomized SDS con-
struction makes the linking of two SDS-based discoveries
for the same pair of nodes hard. Due to space limitations,
we will present this analysis in the full version of the paper.
4.2 Performance
In this section, we analyze approximately the overhead
our method imposes to the network, taking into consider-
ation the overhead of symmetric (OSym) and asymmetric
(OAsym) cryptographic operations. Since the reply mes-
sage is unicasted, the overhead of our method in a route
discovery (initiated by S searching for D) can be calculated
as following:
OTotal = (ϕ.N + 1)OAsym + [4k − 2]OSym.
Note that the average overhead for each connection can
become lower over time, as the use of SDS-based discov-
eries decreases proportion to the total number of route dis-
coveries in the network.
Considering I as the average number of nodes in the path
between S and D, the overhead of using traditional broad-
casting of the request with all nodes opening the trapdoor,
e.g., as in [2, 3], can be calculated as:
O′Total = k[(2N + I)OAsym + 2OSym].
To compare the results, with k growing, we have:
OTotal
O′Total
' OSym
N ×OAsym (3)
The main advantage of the proposed method is the weaker
connection of its overhead to the size of the network.
5 On-going Work
Discovering the destination node is a significant part in
an anonymous routing protocol. In this paper, we propose
an efficient solution and provide a brief analysis. We are
currently developing a a broader analysis, including simu-
lation evaluations, also considering the method integrated in
a system that provides anonymity protection for other parts
of communications, as well as stronger adversary models.
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